Sabah Election Highlights Fragmented Mandate, Rising ‘Sabah for Sabahan’ Sentiment, Says Prof James Chin

KOTA KINABALU — The latest Sabah state election did not produce a decisive mandate but instead reinforced a fragmented political landscape where post-election negotiations, federal–state relations, and the growing “Sabah for Sabahan” sentiment now play a central role in shaping power, according to political analyst Prof James Chin.

Speaking on Smart Talk Sabah hosted by Jo-Anna Sue Henley Rampas, Prof Chin said the election outcome underscored a shift away from campaign rhetoric towards coalition arithmetic and negotiations behind closed doors, reflecting the structural realities of Sabah politics today

“There was no outright majority. Coalition-building became the second phase of the election,” he said, adding that the results themselves were less transformative than the political bargaining that followed.

‘Sabah for Sabahan’ Emerges as Dominant Undercurrent
Prof Chin stressed that the strongest takeaway from the election was the entrenched “Sabah for Sabahan” sentiment, which cut across ethnic and regional communities and could no longer be dismissed as mere identity politics.

“In different communities, it is expressed differently, but you cannot escape the fact that the sentiment is very strong on the ground,” he said.

Among Chinese voters, the sentiment was closely linked to dissatisfaction over the federal government’s handling of Sabah’s 40 per cent revenue entitlement, while in Kadazan-Dusun-Murut (KDM) areas it translated into support for local or Sabah-based parties rather than Peninsula-linked political groups

He noted that long-standing expectations that Sabah would eventually receive its constitutional financial rights — particularly after favourable court rulings — had not been met in a way that convinced ordinary voters.

Federal Missteps Deepened Distrust
According to Prof Chin, several actions by the federal government intensified scepticism among Sabahans, particularly ambiguous messaging on whether the 40 per cent revenue entitlement would be fully honoured.

“The government said it would not pay 40 per cent, then later talked about different wording. For ordinary Sabahans, that raised serious doubts,” he said.
He also pointed to public exchanges involving Prime Minister Datuk Seri Anwar Ibrahim that were perceived locally as dismissive, further eroding trust in Putrajaya’s commitment to Sabah’s financial claims

“These moments had a very visible impact across the state,” Prof Chin added.

Limited Change in Electoral Geography
Despite intense campaigning, Prof Chin observed that Sabah’s electoral map remained largely consistent with past patterns: coastal areas leaning towards Warisan, central regions favouring Gabungan Rakyat Sabah (GRS), and only marginal shifts in urban Chinese-majority seats.

“What we are seeing is essentially GRS 2.0,” he said. “Hajiji remains in charge, Anwar is still there, and federal influence continues.”
The most notable change, he said, was Warisan’s improved performance in certain Chinese-majority urban areas, while rural and interior constituencies showed little deviation from established voting behaviour

Youth Voters Driven by Social Media, Not Party Loyalty
On Undi18 and youth participation, Prof Chin said young voters turned out in significant numbers but were less driven by party ideology and more influenced by social media narratives and perceived candidate authenticity.

“Whoever controlled WhatsApp, TikTok and Reels dominated the narrative,” he said.

He cautioned against over-interpreting youth voting patterns, noting that while urban areas saw more young candidates elected, similar trends were not evident in many KDM constituencies. Youth-produced content, he added, proved far more effective than professionally outsourced campaign material from Peninsular Malaysia

Growing Interest in a Borneo Bloc
Looking ahead, Prof Chin said this was the first election where ordinary voters — not just political elites — openly discussed the idea of Sabah aligning more closely with Sarawak to form a “Borneo Bloc” capable of negotiating collectively with the federal government.

“For the first time, people are saying: let’s follow Sarawak’s example,” he said.
Such a bloc, however, would only be viable if Sabah achieved strong internal unity and coordinated its demands with Sarawak, particularly on issues such as oil and gas revenue, infrastructure funding, and ministerial influence at the federal level

Federal Politics Likely to Remain Coalition-Driven
Prof Chin said the Sabah election would not immediately destabilise the federal government, but it reinforced the reality that future Malaysian governments would continue to rely on Sabah and Sarawak as kingmakers.

“No party from Peninsular Malaysia is likely to secure a clear majority on its own,” he said. “Whoever has the largest block will still need Sabah and Sarawak to form government.”
He argued that Sabah and Sarawak would be in a stronger position if they negotiated jointly rather than separately, reviving the spirit of shared federal demands rooted in the original Malaysia Agreement negotiations of the early 1960s

Election Clarified Power Dynamics, Not Stability
While the election did not deliver political certainty, Prof Chin said it offered clarity on how power now operates in Sabah — through negotiation, federal leverage, and a renewed assertion of state rights.

“The election may not have given us stability,” he said, “but it has clarified how power is negotiated, how federalism works in practice, and how Sabah continues to define its relationship with the centre.”

-Dino